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ScreenConnect CVE-2026-84869 used against MSP technician clients; fix is 26.6.5

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By TrustList Editorial

Huntress reports 688,000 guest file-run requests across 42 MSP servers and one confirmed workstation compromise; update host clients and Access agents to 26.6.5 or later.

About ScreenConnect CVE-2026-84869 used against MSP technician clients; fix is 26.6.5

ScreenConnect CVE-2026-84869 used against MSP technician clients; fix is 26.6.5

16 November 2026: Huntress has confirmed attacks on a ScreenConnect flaw, CVE-2026-84869, that let a guest in a remote session push a file to a technician's computer and have the technician's own client run it with no prompt. ConnectWise disclosed the flaw on 8 September 2026 with a CVSS score of 9.9, and the US CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 11 September. The fix is version 26.6.5 or later for host clients and Access agents.

Not yet independently verified. We read the Huntress post; its date is printed as 16 November 2026. We could not open the SecurityWeek report that corroborates it (the site blocked our request), and we did not find ConnectWise's own bulletin text for the CVE. Counts and dates below are Huntress's figures, not independently checked. We will update this when it can be confirmed, and remove this note.

What Huntress observed

Between 20 October and 16 November 2026, Huntress counted 688,000 "run file" requests from attacker-controlled guests against 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers, from 29 source IP addresses. The files were named update.bat or update followed by eight hex characters. The guests asked repeatedly in case a technician happened to join.

On 12 November one MSP technician joined a blank-named Access session. Within about nine seconds their workstation ran a guest-pushed batch file, reported to a Telegram bot, downloaded an installer from an attacker domain and started a rogue ScreenConnect client pointing at the attacker's own relay. Huntress also saw a second technician's client run a harmless marker file on 13 November, which it reads as a test of the exploit.

Why updating the server is not enough

The vulnerable code runs on the technician's machine, so patching the ScreenConnect server alone does not close the hole. Huntress says the server's connection history records which client version each technician used, and that in the cases it examined many technicians were still on 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8 clients weeks after the fix shipped.

ConnectWise advised removing the TransferFiles permission as an interim measure, and Huntress repeats that for anyone who cannot patch today.

Steps for MSP and IT teams

Update every technician's host client to 26.6.5 or later, and update any Access agents that ConnectWise lists. Check the server's connection history for older client versions that are still in use.

Then look for exposure. On the server, Huntress suggests working on a copy of the Session.db file and looking for file-run or file-sent events from guest connections, especially repeated requests for update.bat files in blank-named sessions, a marker.txt file, or any file path containing a parent-directory traversal. Check whether a host connection was open at the same moment, because that overlap is the exposure. On technician workstations, look for the ScreenConnect client running script files from its Temp folder, unfamiliar items in the Startup folder, and any ScreenConnect client whose command line points at a relay you do not own.

If you find a hit, isolate the workstation, remove the rogue client and its installer files, and rotate every credential reachable from it: RMM, PSA, ScreenConnect, password vault and customer admin accounts. Huntress advises assuming the attacker could see everything the technician could.

To shrink the attack surface, restrict who can join sessions as a guest, review guest-side permissions on Support sessions, limit access to the ScreenConnect web interface and installer downloads by IP address or VPN where you can, and do not join unattended sessions you cannot tie to a customer.

Our remote support category lists other remote support tools.

A separate set of attacks

Huntress says this campaign is distinct from the SCKit worm activity it responded to earlier in November, and from unauthorised guest sessions with crypto exchange names that it reported on 13 November across more than 100 MSP servers. It does not claim the attacker behind each is the same, except that it assesses with high confidence that the file-spraying operator and the operator of the relay domain are one party.

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