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Cursor ties fake-extension breach to a key leaked at Fireworks

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By TrustList Editorial

Two weeks after a tampered coding extension appeared in its marketplace, Cursor says at most 5,000 users could have received it, and that it has moved all inference away from the vendor where the attack began.

About Cursor ties fake-extension breach to a key leaked at Fireworks

Cursor ties fake-extension breach to a key leaked at Fireworks

13 November 2026: Cursor says the attacker who planted a backdoored coding extension in its marketplace on 29 October got in through an access key it had issued to Fireworks, its model training and inference vendor, and that at most 5,000 users could have received the tampered build. The company believes the incident is contained and has contacted every affected customer, so a team that has heard nothing was, by its account, not in the exposed data.

Not yet independently verified. The account is Cursor's own, from its post of 13 November and its notice of 29 October. The counts and percentages are the company's, and no outside investigator's report has been published. We will update this when it can be confirmed, and remove this note.

From a shared storage bucket to the support desk

The key had been issued to Fireworks and, Cursor says, was exposed there. The attacker used it to copy a read-only storage bucket the two companies used to share data. That bucket held coding agent traces, mostly from 2025, taken from sessions that were not in Privacy Mode and which Cursor was permitted to use for model training. A small number of those traces contained credentials that had not been redacted. Cursor puts the share of customers whose API credentials were exposed at less than 0.01%, and the share of users whose traces were exposed at fewer than 0.05%.

Those credentials were the way in to some of the software-as-a-service tools Cursor runs on. Through them the attacker reached archived, non-production source code repositories, some holding business contact details, along with limited customer support data and email conversations, product usage metrics and contact details, summaries of some coding agent conversations, and credentials that users had sent to the support team. We reported the two October breaches at Fireworks earlier this month; this is the first full account from one of its customers of what followed.

Eleven hours in the extension cache

On 29 October the attacker used a credential stolen from Cursor's internal systems to place unauthorised copies of a widely used coding agent extension, versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for Windows and macOS, on the cache that serves Cursor's VS Code extension marketplace. Cursor says the extension's real publisher did not ship these copies, that no flaw in the publisher's product was involved, and that Open VSX, the source the marketplace draws on, never carried the malware. The build was available for about 11 hours.

According to the original notice, the code collected host and user details, added an attacker-controlled SSH key labelled svc-telemetry to the authorized keys file, and tried to open a persistent reverse SSH tunnel. Switching on the local SSH service needs administrator rights, so on most machines that step failed, and the attacker's server has since been taken offline with the hosting provider's help. The key and the persistence scripts were still installed.

What stayed out of reach

Cursor lists what the attacker did not touch: prompts and code from Privacy Mode users, live traffic and active inference requests, the production systems that run the product, customer code repositories, and the app and its official updates. The company ships its releases from a separate code hosting system the attacker never reached, and says no release signing keys were exposed.

Checks for teams that updated on 29 October

Anyone who installed or updated the extension from Cursor's marketplace on macOS or Windows between 2:27am and 1:35pm Pacific time that day should look for the svc-telemetry key and run the remediation scripts in the notice. Cursor warns that uninstalling the extension may not be enough, because the payload drops standalone scripts that keep running, and it asks affected teams to rotate any credentials reachable from those machines. Where credentials were exposed in traces, team admins were emailed the specific keys to rotate.

The company has moved all inference traffic off Fireworks, rotated every credential in use across its internal systems, rebuilt the marketplace, redeployed its production infrastructure and brought in outside forensics specialists. The last attacker activity it saw was on 1 November, and it was blocked. Cursor says it will update the post if anything important changes.

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